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REMOVAL PROVISIONS OF THE PHILIPPINE-UNITED
STATES MILITARY BASES AGREEMENT: CAN
THE UNITED STATES
TAKE IT ALL?
I. INTRODUCTION
Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Base, located on the Philippine
island of Luzon, constitute the largest American military installations
outside the United States. The United States considers these bases' logis-
tical capabilities to be extremely important military assets.1 Command
and control facilities at both bases are also substantial.2
Prospective termination of the bases' lease, however, draws near.
America first established its military presence when Commodore
Dewey's forces arrived in Manila Bay on May 1, 1898.' The 1947 Mili-
tary Bases Agreement4 embodies America's current right to unhampered
1. It is said of Clark Air Base that "Et]he runways and aircraft parking areas ... are
superb as are the warehouses and underground storage facilities for supplies and munitions.
The petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) capacity is roughly equal to that of Kennedy Inter-
national Airport in New York." United States-Philippines Relations and the New Base and Aid
Agreement: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Comm. on
Foreign Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 193-94 (1983) (statement of Lieutenant Colonel William
E. Berry, Jr., Asst. Professor at the United States Air Force Academy) [hereinafter 1983 Hear-
ings]. The Subic Naval Supply Depot is described as "the largest U.S. overseas depot and can
support every type of ship and aircraft in the Seventh Fleet inventory .... The Ship Repair
Facility can perform 65% of all the maintenance required for the upkeep of Seventh Fleet
ships." Id. at 194.
2. In describing communications equipment at Clark, Lieutenant Colonel Berry said:
[It] is part of a three-way communications network involving similar resources in
Japan and Korea. Clark has two satellite terminals which make an important com-
munications link between US forces in the Pacific and those in the Indian Ocean.
According to Air Force officials, no other facility in the Western Pacific offers such a
variety of communication capabilities.
Id.
3. F. BUNGE, PHILIPPINES: A COUNTRY STUDY 22 (1984). At the time, the Philippines
was a Spanish colony. The United States declared war on Spain when the United States battle-
ship Maine was blown up in the harbor of Havana, Cuba, on February 15, 1898. W. BUTLER,
J. HUMPHREY & G. BIssON, THE DECLINE OF DEMOCRACY IN THE PHILIPPINES 2 (1977).
Commodore Dewey was sent to Manila Bay to destroy the Spanish armada harbored there.
The American presence definitely offset the Spanish military forces. In her defeat, Spain
agreed to cede its colonies to the United States through the Treaty of Paris. F. BUNGE, supra,
at 22-23. See Treaty of Peace, Dec. 10, 1898, United States-Spain, art. III, 30 Stat. 1754, 1755.
The Philippines remained a United States colony from 1898 to 1946.
4. Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America
Concerning Military Bases, Mar. 14, 1947, United States-Philippines, 61 Stat. 4019, T.I.A.S.
No. 1775 [hereinafter 1947 Agreement].
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use of the military bases in the Philippines.' An amendment shortened
the original ninety-nine year period to twenty-five years, with a proviso
for renewal if mutually agreed upon at the termination of that period.6
After September 16, 1991, United States access to the bases can be cut off
with one year's notice from either government.'
Philippine President Corazon Aquino has said that she will respect
the Agreement until 1991 and then keep her options open.' She has indi-
cated that she prefers a new treaty to an extension of the current lease. 9
The United States, however, has begun assessing its own options should
the treaty be terminated. Departure of the American forces could, not
unrealistically, lead to their replacement by Soviet forces. The Soviets
already occupy former American bases in Vietnam's Cam Ranh Bay.
Together, Subic Bay and Cam Ranh Bay could become a "mutually sup-
portive" pair of bases, increasing the risk of American combat operations
in the South China region."1
This Comment examines the right of the United States to remove its
base installations on or before the 1947 Agreement's termination. The
removal provisions contained in Article XVII of the 1947 Agreement
provide:
5. In 1944, the United States Congress called for the grant of independence to the Philip-
pines, but naval and air bases "necessary for the mutual protection" of both countries were to
be retained. S.J. Res. 93, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., U.S. CODE CONG. SERVICE 610 (1944). A year
later, the Philippine Congress authorized the Philippine President to negotiate the establish-
ment of such bases. H.R.J. Res. 4, July 28, 1945, Philippines, 41 Official Gazette 349. Thus in
1947, Philippine President Manuel Roxas and Paul McNutt, High Commissioner to the Phil-
ippines, signed the 1947 Agreement, which granted the United States the right to retain use of
the bases. 1947 Agreement, supra note 4, art. I.
Republican members of Congress resisted Philippine independence on the basis that it
would injure American security and trade interests in the Far East. C. Buss, THE UNITED
STATES AND THE PHILIPPINES: BACKGROUND FOR POLICY 11 (1977). However, the United
States officially recognized Philippine independence in 22 U.S.C. § 1394(a) (1982), which pro-
vided for the President to withdraw sovereignty on the 4th day of July following a 10-year
transition period. The same statute gave the President the authority to enter into negotiations
over the status of the military bases. Id. § 1394(b); see also id. §§ 1385-1392 (providing for
transfer of property rights to the Philippine government, except for the retention of the bases).
6. Exchange of Notes Amending Article XXIX of the 1947 Agreement, Sept. 16, 1966,
United States-Philippines, 17 U.S.T. 1212, T.I.A.S. No. 6084 [hereinafter Exchange of Notes].
7. Based on the Bohlen-Serrano Agreement of 1959, Article XXIX was amended such
that the 1947 Agreement and its revisions remain in force until September 16, 1991, "after
which, unless extended for a longer period by mutual agreement, it shall become subject to
termination upon one year's notice by either government." Id.
8. Tifft, Now the Hard Part, TIME, Mar. 10, 1986, at 26.
9. Philippine President Aquino has said she will seek to have a full treaty replace the
present executive agreement. N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1986, at A12, col. 5.
10. HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 99TH CONG., 2D SESs., ASSESSING AMERICA'S
OPTIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES 69, 85 (Comm. Print 1986) [hereinafter 1986 HOUSE REPORT].
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1. It is mutually agreed that the United States shall have
the right to remove or dispose of any or all removable improve-
ments, equipment or facilities located at or on any base and
paid for with funds of the United States. No export tax shall be
charged on any material or equipment so removed from the
Philippines.
2. All buildings and structures which are erected by the
United States in the bases shall be the property of the United
States and may be removed by it before the expiration of this
Agreement or the earlier relinquishment of the base on which
the structures are situated. There shall be no obligation on the
part of [either country] to rebuild or repair any destruc+ion or
damage inflicted from any cause whatsoever on any of the said
buildings or structures owned or used by the United States in
the bases. The United States is not obligated to turn over the
bases to the Philippines at the expiration of this Agreement or
the earlier relinquishment of any bases in the condition in
which they were at the time of their occupation, nor is the Phil-
ippines obliged to make any compensation to the United States
for the improvements made in the bases or for the buildings or
structures left thereon, all of which shall become the property
of the Philippines upon the termination of the Agreement or
the earlier relinquishment by the United States of the bases
where the structures have been built.11
Article XVII appears to vest the United States with a broad and
flexible removal right, while raising issues on the parameters of this right.
For instance, does it give the United States the right to transfer or de-
stroy all structures for security purposes just prior to termination of the
Agreement? Moreover, does the Philippines have a duty to compensate
the United States should base facilities be left behind? In answering these
inquiries, it is vital to define the terms "removable improvements, equip-
ment or facilities," and "buildings and structures."
Precise rules of international law that deal with the removal of fix-
tures are non-existent, but analogies can be made to the domestic law of
both the United States and the Philippines. The two countries share
common domestic property law principles. Where disputes on defini-
tions or rules may arise, this Comment argues that Philippine civil law
should more properly control the resolution. This Comment then inter-
prets the Agreement's removal provisions based on guidelines from the
11. 1947 Agreement, supra note 4, art. XVII.
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Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.12
Underlying these issues is the often sensitive question of how to ap-
proach the termination of military base agreements. Some view the issue
purely as a political matter, to be discussed only at the negotiation table.
Others view such agreements as "unequal treaties" and therefore void-
able at the option of the weaker party. 3 This Comment considers the
possibility that the Philippines will adopt the "unequal treaty" concept in
order to invalidate the removal provisions. It is recognized, however,
that this concept has not been fully accepted in international law.
This Comment argues that the removal provisions should not be ex-
ercised. As to the validity of the provisions, the United States and the
Philippines arguably did not enjoy equal bargaining power at the incep-
tion of the Agreement. If the disproportion is sufficient, the 1947 Agree-
ment is an "unequal treaty" and its provisions are voidable at the option
of the Philippines. As to interpretation of the provisions, a rational read-
ing of Article XVII suggests that the removal right only gives the United
States the operational flexibility to improve and maintain facilities while
American forces remain at the bases, not the right to destroy the base
structures just before right of access to the bases terminates. The opera-
tional purpose of the provisions should then be expressly stated in any
future treaty between the two countries.
II. HISTORY OF THE 1947 AGREEMENT
Filipinos often say they have a "love-hate" relationship with the
United States. During colonial days, the United States cultivated in the
Filipinos a respect for democratic institutions. The Philippines looked
upon the United States as its liberator in World War II and has since
remained America's steadfast ally. Forty years of self-rule, however,
have nurtured a nationalistic pride among the people. Most Filipinos no
longer cherish the thought that they were once called America's "little
brown brothers."
12. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 22, 1969, opened for signature May
23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/ConfE39/27, reprinted in J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER & N. LEECH, THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 194 (Supp. 1981) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. The
Convention entered into force on January 27, 1980. As of December 31, 1979, the United
States was not a party. Articles 31 and 32, which are discussed in this Comment are, however,
representative of emerging customary rules of interpretation, and to that extent, will serve as
guidelines for interpretation. See M. VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
TREATIES 342-46 (1985).
13. Lester, Bizerta and the Unequal Treaty Theory, 11 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 847, 850
(1962); A. DAVID, THE STRATEGY OF TREATY TERMINATION 307-08 (1975). See infra notes
91-108 and accompanying text.
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The following materials on pre-independence legislation, the 1947
Agreement and its subsequent amendments reflect this tension as the
Philippines has increasingly asserted sovereignty over the base territories.
These materials show the efforts to achieve a more equitable relationship
with more reciprocal rights and obligations than existed under the "fa-
ther-son" relationship of colonial days.
A. Pre-Independence Legislation
As far back as 1916, Congress stated in the preamble of the Jones
Act its intent to recognize Philippine independence as soon as a stable
government could be established.14 Subsequently, Congress drafted the
Hare-Hawes-Cutting bill"5 to recognize Philippine independence after a
ten-year transition period, during which the United States could retain
its military bases.16 The bill also provided the President with the power
to negotiate with other foreign states for the perpetual neutralization of
the Philippines upon its independence.17
President Hoover vetoed the act, in part because the concept of neu-
tralization was inconsistent with retention of military bases in the Philip-
pines.1 8 Congress overrode the veto and repassed the act in 1933,
retaining the two inconsistent clauses. 9 This time, the Philippine Con-
gress rejected it because the bases were "inconsistent with true indepen-
dence, violate national dignity, and are subject to misunderstanding."2
In 1934, President Roosevelt urged that a new law be enacted eliminating
military bases "simultaneously with the accomplishment of final Philip-
pine independence," but left the question of naval bases open.21
The Tydings-McDuffie Act22 was the final result of the indepen-
dence bill drafts. Although it was almost identical to the Hare-Hawes-
Cutting bill, it provided for dismantling of the military bases and for
renegotiating naval and refueling stations with the Philippine govern-
ment no later than two years after the proclamation of Philippine
independence.23
While the United States policy encouraged progressive steps to
14. Jones Act, ch. 416, 39 Stat. 545 (1916).
15. H.R. 7233, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 75 CONG. REC. 1554 (1932).
16. 76 CONG. REC. 1078, § 10 (1932).
17. Id. at 1079, § 11.
18. 76 CONG. REC. 1761 (1933).
19. Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act, ch. 11, 47 Stat. 761 (1933).
20. 77 CONG. REC. 130 (1934).
21. Id. at 3715.
22. Tydings-McDuffie Act, ch. 84, 48 Stat. 456 (1934).
23. Id. § 10, at 463.
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political independence, the Philippines grew in economic dependence.
Tariff relief provisions, such as removing restrictions on Philippine im-
ports, had been enacted in 1913 as well-meaning attempts to stimulate
economic development.24 The principal result of such acts, however, was
to make the Philippines almost completely dependent on American
markets.25
To a great extent, the Philippines was also militarily dependent on
the United States. American forces were largely responsible for the ex-
ternal security and defense of the islands. No attempt was made to or-
ganize a Philippine army until 1935. Even then, the role of the local
armed forces waxed and waned until long after World War 11.26
B. The 1947 Agreement
In 1941, Japan attacked the Philippines. Shortly after the attack,
American and Filipino forces surrendered under the pressure of superior
numbers. MacArthur led the American forces to reclaim the islands in
1944. The final fighting was fierce, leaving Manila one of the most devas-
tated cities in the world after the war.
The war left both the United States and the Philippines concerned
with maintaining security and peace in the West Pacific region. High
Commissioner Paul McNutt expressed his perception of the United
States' obligation to the Far East in a 1946 radio address:
[lit is the armed might of the United States, actual and poten-
tial, which must be depended upon by the United Nations...
24. F. BUNGE, supra note 3, at 33. High Commissioner Paul McNutt acknowledged in a
January 18, 1946 letter to the President:
One is forced to conclude that the institution . . . of reciprocal free trade and its
continuance.., to 1941 over territory which was pledged ... to a position of inde-
pendence was unwise in that it embraced the mutually exclusive aims of political
separatism and economic and financial dependence. . . . [Alfter over 30 years of
forced development into almost complete economic dependence a sudden reversal of
economy is impossible without courting disaster.
BUREAU OF PUBLIc AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 8554, 8 FOREIGN RELATIONS
OF THE UNITED STATES 865 (1946) [hereinafter FOREIGN RELATIONS 1946].
25. 83 CONG. REc. A1023 (1938).
26. F. BUNGE, supra note 3, at 251-52. "The Filipino people know that the principal duty
of a sovereign toward its wards is to protect them from external aggression." FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS 1946, supra note 24, at 865.
27. F. BUNGE, supra note 3, at 39. An estimated one million Filipinos perished, many
during the last months. There was also tremendous physical destruction by the time the war
ended. Id. On January 18, 1946, McNutt wrote that: "The situation here is critical. It does
not at this moment seem humanly possible for the Filipino people, ravaged and demoralized by
the cruelest and most destructive of wars.., to cope with the coincidence of political indepen-
dence, sharp downward revision of economic standards, budgetary bankruptcy, and rehabilita-
tion." FOREIGN RELATIONS 1946, supra note 24, at 865.
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to furnish the police power and the moral hindrance to would-
be aggressors. For this purpose, we need bases in the Far East.
And bases in the Far East mean bases in the Philippines.28
In its Joint Resolution of June 29, 1944, Congress enlarged the right
of the United States to reserve not only naval and fuelling stations but
also military bases in the Philippines.29 This resolution gave the Presi-
dent authority "to retain such bases, necessary appurtenances [and]
rights . . . , in addition to any provided for by the [Tydings-McDuffie
Act], as he may deem necessary for the mutual protection of [both
countries]." 30
Demoralized by the war and suffering inflation and food shortages,
Filipinos prepared for the transition to independence, scheduled for July
4, 1946.31 Already dependent on the United States for its economy and
security, most Filipinos willingly agreed to a package of treaties which
provided rehabilitation funds even though it qualified their new indepen-
dence.32 The most controversial treaty was the 1947 Agreement, in
which the Philippines granted the United States the right to retain use of
naval and air bases in the country for ninety-nine years.33 This seemed to
28. 92 CONG. REc. Al 100 (1946) (quoted in remarks of Hon. Carlos P. Romulo).
Just a few months earlier, however, House Representatives had criticized such a "police
power" perception. On January 14, 1946, Representative Ludlow said:
With Japan beaten to her knees ... why is it necessary to keep 70,000 of our Ameri-
can boys in the Philippines? ... [W]e naturally wonder whether too much stress is
not being placed on world regulation.... [B]ut it is not up to us to reach out and try
to regulate everything around the earth. President Benjamin Harrison... once said
to me: "We have no commission from God to police the world."
Id. at A35 (statement of Rep. Louis Ludlow). On January 28, Representative Miller noted
that American soldiers questioned the need for the large number of occupation troops in the
Philippines. He said: "It does seem ridiculous that we should have so many troops watching
our friends .... [H]aving an armed force in our friend's house, watching every move they
make, is not conducive to a lasting friendship." Id. at A287 (statement of Rep. A.L. Miller).
29. S.J. REs. 93, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., U.S. CODE CONG. SERVICE 610 (1944).
30. Id.
31. F. BUNGE, supra note 3, at 40.
32. The 1947 Military Bases Agreement, the 1947 Military Assistance Agreement and the
1951 Mutual Defense Treaty served to integrate the Philippines into emerging United States
security arrangements in the Western Pacific. F. BUNGE, supra note 3, at 42-43.
The Military Assistance Agreement, signed one week after the Military Bases Agreement,
provides for arms assistance, training and the use of facilities and vessels by the Philippine
Armed Forces. Military Assistance Agreement, Mar. 21, 1947, United States-Philippines, art.
6, 61 Stat. 3283, 3284, T.I.A.S. No. 1662, at 85 [hereinafter Military Assistance Agreement].
The Mutual Defense Treaty provides that the contracting parties would act to meet the
common dangers of external armed attack on either party, in accordance with their constitu-
tional processes. Mutual Defense Treaty, Aug. 30, 1951, United States-Philippines, arts. III &
IV, 3 U.S.T. 3947, 3950, T.I.A.S. No. 2529, at 6 [hereinafter Mutual Defense Treaty].
33. 1947 Agreement, supra note 4, art. I. For the current status of article I, see the 1979
Amendments, infra note 61.
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transform the islands into a "quasi-protectorate" rather than an in-
dependent nation now responsible for its own destiny.34
In Dizon v. Commanding General of the Philippine Ryukus Com-
mand,35 the Philippine Supreme Court decided that the 1947 Agreement
was constitutional. The Court noted that under the 1935 Philippine
Constitution, the generally accepted principles of international law were
adopted as part of the law of the nation.36 The majority then found that
the military base rights granted to the United States were "no less than
those conceded by the rule of international law to 'a foreign army al-
lowed to march through a friendly country or to be stationed in it, by
permission of its government or sovereign,' "37 thus the 1947 Agreement
could not be constitutionally objectionable. 38 Twenty years later, how-
ever, then Philippine Secretary of Justice Claudio Teehankee questioned
whether the Philippine President alone had the constitutional authority
to enter into an agreement for the use of sizeable portions of Philippine
territory.
39
Constitutional or not, the 1947 Agreement's provisions have caused
34. The United States acknowledged that "[s]ince the Filipinos will probably be unable to
provide substantial air and naval forces and will require a number of years to develop their
ground forces, the United States should be prepared to meet requirements for air and naval
forces and, initially, to provide nearly all ground forces." BUREAU OF PUB. AFFAIRS, U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 8451, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1206 (1945)
(letter of Secretary of War Stimson to President Truman) [hereinafter FOREIGN RELATIONS
1945]. A January 1945 editorial said that the "Filipino economy has been almost ruined by
the Japanese invasion" and acknowledged that even with the independence of the islands, there
would exist a "quasi-protectorate which the United States would practically maintain from the
naval and air bases to be ceded." 92 CONG. REC. A583 (1946) (remarks of Hon. Carlos P.
Romulo) (quoting Springfield (Mass.) Republican, Jan. 14, 1946).
It was understood at the time that such a joint defense system would limit Philippine
exercise of foreign policy. The article of a Filipino lawyer named Vicente Villamin stated:
[A] military establishment on Philippine territory... means that the Philippines will
... inevitably be involved in any war which America may wage in that section of the
world. Thus the Philippines, under an American law, will not have the first attribute
of sovereign independence-the power to desist from or to declare war on her own
volition.
91 CONG. REc. A5358 (1945) (statement of Rep. John Phillips). Another editorial stated
that: "These bases limited the independence of the Philippines in foreign policy and in the
power to declare war or even to remain neutral." Id. at A5620 (1945) (remarks of Hon. Carlos
P. Romulo) (quoting Rochester (N.Y.) Times-Union, Dec. 11, 1945).
35. Judgment of July 22, 1948, Supreme Court of the Philippines, 46 Official Gazette,
Supp. No. 1, at 68.
36. Id. at 73.
37. Id. at 74.
38. Id. at 76.
39. Letter from Claudio Teehankee, Philippine Secretary of Justice (currently Chief Jus-
tice of the Philippine Supreme Court), to the Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs (Nov. 14,
1968), reprinted in Lavind, Executive Agreements, 44 PHILIPPINE L.J. 450, 482 (1969).
Notwithstanding the theory that the 1947 Agreement is an executive agreement and therefore
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tension over the years. Along with the right to retain bases free of rent,"
the United States has navigational access to Philippine waters, 41 exemp-
tions from customs42 and income tax,43 the use of public services,' and
primary jurisdiction over criminal offenses.4' The evolution of some pro-
visions demonstrates how the countries have sought to deal with com-
plaints that the Agreement interferes with Philippine sovereignty.
1. Criminal jurisdiction
Commentators have described the exercise of extraterritorial juris-
diction rights as being incompatible with the principle of territorial sov-
ereignty. Some would argue that the imposition of such rights are still a
"tool of colonialism. ' 46 Under Article XIII of the 1947 Agreement, the
Philippines divested itself almost completely of criminal jurisdiction over
on-base offenses.47 In time of war, Philippine jurisdiction is virtually
non-existent, as the United States could then also exercise jurisdiction
over off-base offenses committed by American personnel.48 Because of
Philippine opposition to this extraterritoriality, the provisions have been
amended several times in order to make them more acceptable.49
A 1965 amendment provided the Philippine government with the
right to exercise primary jurisdiction over members of the American
forces, except for offenses solely against United States property or secur-
ity, or offenses against a member of the American forces or a civilian or
their property."0 The United States also retained primary jurisdiction
did not require Senate concurrence, (see generally Lavini, supra), the authority of Philippine
President Roxas in signing the 1947 Agreement remains an open question.
40. 1947 Agreement, supra note 4, preamble, para. 2.
41. Id. art. IV, para. 1.
42. Id. art. V.
43. Id. art. XII.
44. Id. art. VII. United States military forces were allowed to use "any and all public
utilities, other services and facilities, airfields, ports, harbors, roads, highways, railroads,
bridges, viaducts, canals, lakes, rivers and streams in the Phillipines under conditions no less
favorable" to the Philippine military forces. Id.
45. Id. art. XIII.
46. L. CHEN, STATE SUCCESSION RELATING TO UNEQUAL TREATIES 113 (1974).
47. 1947 Agreement, supra note 4, art. XIII.
48. Id. para. 6. In drafting the 1947 Agreement, the War and Navy Departments at first
asserted that even in time of peace the United States should exercise jurisdiction over any
offenses committed by American personnel. Philippine President Roxas took strong exception
to this provision and it was not included in the final draft of the Agreement. FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS 1946, supra note 24, at 881.
49. Major revisions of the criminal jurisdiction provisions were adopted in 1965, 1979 and
1983. See infra notes 50, 53 & 68 and accompanying text.
50. Criminal Jurisdiction Arrangements, Aug. 10, 1965, United States-Philippines, art.
XIII, § 3(b)(i), 16 U.S.T. 1090, T.I.A.S. No. 5851.
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over offenses "arising out of any act or omission done in the performance
of official duty." 5' Much was left to be desired, however, and a compari-
son of the Agreement's provisions to the NATO Status of Forces Agree-
ment 2 sharpens perception of the inequity of revised Article XIII."
2. Aid or rent?
The Philippine government has received United States funding since
independence. Whether such funds are "aid" or "rent" for the bases has
been a subject of much debate. The funds cannot technically be called
"rent" even though they act as such for all practical purposes, since the
Agreement's preamble expressly provides the Philippines grant the bases
free of rent. 4 "Rent" would connote an actual contractual obligation by
the United States to compensate for the use of the bases." "Aid," on the
other hand, connotes one-sided charity without reciprocity of obliga-
tion. 6 Some Filipinos feel that the use of the word "aid" is an affront to
51. Id. art. XIII, § 3(b)(ii).
52. The Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the status
of their Forces (SOFA), signed on June 19, 1951, was designed to "determine the status of the
NATO Forces while serving on the territory of another member of the Alliance and to give
these Forces a standard of legal treatment wherever they happen to be." It was signed by
several European countries along with the United States. S. LAZAREFF, STATUS OF MILITARY
FORCES UNDER CURRENT INTERNATIONAL LAW 2-3 (1971).
53. The criminal jurisdiction provisions of the Agreement provide an on- or off-base ar-
rangement for dividing jurisdiction. The NATO formula applies regardless of geographic area.
Id. at 41-42.
The revised version of Article XIII is similar to the NATO Status of Forces Agreement
(SOFA) with respect to the United States being a contracting party in both treaties, they both
deal with military defense arrangements, and they define the jurisdiction to be exercised. Note,
Criminal Jurisdiction under the Revised Bases Agreement, 41 PHILIPPINE L.J. 728, 742 (1966).
However, SOFA and the Bases Agreement (before and after the 1965 revision) differ in
several respects. First, SOFA provides for mutual grants of rights and mutual surrender of
jurisdiction. The Agreement's grant of the use of territory is unilateral. The second is with
regard to the award of damages for acts done while not in the performance of duty. While
SOFA provides that the assessment of damages is made by the receiving state, the Agreement
provides that the American authorities, or the sending state, assess damages. Third, under the
Agreement, the authority to determine whether an offense arose from an act done in the per-
formance of duty is vested in the Commanding officer of the offender. Under article VIII, § 8
of SOFA, this determination is left to an arbitrator mutually selected by the contracting par-
ties. Finally, the two treaties differ in regard to the custody of the offender who commits an
offense subjecting him to the jurisdiction of the receiving state. Under SOFA, custody of the
offender remains with the sending state only until the offender is charged. Under the Agree-
ment, custody of the offender remains with the United States until the final judgment. Id. at
742-45.
54. 1947 Agreement, supra note 4, preamble, para. 2.
55. The distinction is also important in that if the funds were rent, the Philippine govern-
ment would have a free hand in spending the money, without being subject to annual United
States Congressional approval. F. BUNGE, supra note 3, at 220.
56. See 123 CONG. REc. 9724 (1977) (statement of Rep. Won Pat). Representative Won
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national pride.5 7
At present, the only existing obligation of the United States presi-
dent is to make his "best effort to obtain appropriation of security assist-
ance." '  Further, American grants of funds have been made in
instruments separate from the Agreement itself or its amendments.5 9
This fact suggests that the funds need not be conditions to the grant of
bases.6 o
C. The 1979 Amendments
The 1979 Amendments to the Agreement reaffirmed Philippine sov-
ereignty over the bases. 61 The late 1960's and 1970's saw the Philippines
Pat asserted that "Itlhe word aid isn't realistic. It is a subterfuge, a coverup. The U.S. is
paying the Filipinos for the use of a portion of their islands for our own national interest." Id.
57. Teodoro Valencia, a well-known Filipino newspaper columnist, said:
Let the U.S. Congress stop giving us "aid" and start paying rentals or get out of the
country. If they don't want to get out, let the world know they're here by force of
arms. In such a case, we would be getting the queerest kind of protection from
outside invaders by being invaded by the protector.
124 CONG. REc. 15,448 (1978) (statement of Rep. Won Pat).
58. U.S., Philippines Conclude Bases Agreement Review, 83 DEP'T ST. BULL. 21 (Aug.
1983) [hereinafter Bases Agreement Review]. It seems that the President can promise no more
than his best efforts to obtain funds because of the constitutional allocation of powers. In
response to a 1983 letter of inquiry by Representative Stephen Solarz, the State Department
wrote that:
Because of the Constitutional allocation of powers, the Executive Branch cannot
obligate the Congress to appropriate funds. Thus, references to military assistance
made in connection with military facilities agreements have taken the form of under-
takings by the Executive Branch to seek security assistance funds through the annual
authorization and appropriation process. Consequently, regardless of the specific
terms used in any agreement, each undertaking is, in effect, a "best efforts"
obligation.
1983 Hearings, supra note 1, at 63 (letter by Powell A. Moore of the State Department).
59. The Philippines began receiving aid through the Military Assistance Agreement, supra
note 32, a treaty distinct from the 1947 Military Bases Agreement. President Carter's 1979
agreement and President Reagan's 1983 agreement to provide United States appropriations
have been in the form of letters. These letters were separate instruments from the amendments
themselves. See infra note 60.
60. Representative Robert Drinan, in a session of the House, quoted from a March 25,
1980 article in the Christian Science Monitor:
It will be argued that we cannot cut or defer military assistance because such
assistance is an integral part of the bases agreement. However, security assistance
was not included in the text of the official agreement. Instead, the aid commitment
was made in a letter from President Carter... in which he pledged the administra-
tion's "best effort."
... There is nothing sacred or untouchable about the security assistance request
... for the Philippines.
126 CONG. REc. 6589 (1980) (statement of Rep. Drinan).
61. Amendments to the Military Base Agreement, Jan. 7, 1979, United States-Philippines,
30 U.S.T. 863, T.I.A.S. No. 9224 [hereinafter 1979 Amendments]. Representatives of both
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markedly asserting its leadership in the emerging Third World Bloc. The
United States itself recognized a gradual changeover from the colonial
relationship of prewar years.62
The 1979 Amendments provided for: (1) the installation of a Philip-
pine commander at each base; (2) the reduction of areas under United
States control on certain bases, while assuring the American forces of
unhampered military operations, effective command and control over fa-
cilities and personnel; (3) the Philippine takeover of perimeter defense;
and (4) a thorough review of the Agreement every five years.63 President
Jimmy Carter promised his best efforts to obtain a security assistance
package of $500 million for the 1979-83 period.'
D. The 1983 Memorandum of Agreement
The 1983 Memorandum 6 was a review of the existing Agreement
rather than a renegotiation. It requires the United States to consult with
the Philippine government before it can use the bases for military combat
operations outside the purposes of the Mutual Defense Treaty.66 The
United States agreed to increase the access of Philippine commanders to
the base facilities and pledged that American personnel would abstain
from political activity in the Philippines.67
The only explicit amendment in the 1983 Memorandum gave the
Philippines-along with the United States-the right to suspend the ap-
plication of any provisions upon sixty-day notice in time of war. 68 The
governments agreed to modify the 1947 Agreement such that the bases were now "Philippine
military bases over which Philippine sovereignty extends." Id. at 864. Article I, article XXVI
and annexes A and B of the 1947 Agreement were superseded. Id.
62. See 115 CONG. REc. 34,794 (1969) (statement of Rep. Mansfield). Representative
Mansfield commented that:
It would be well to bear in mind ... that the Philippines ceased to be an American
colony in 1946, and that ... the situation has changed markedly. A quarter of a
century later, the Philippines has moved a long way... from these vestiges of the
past. A social, political, and economic momentum has been generated on the basis of
an awakened Filipino nationalism which, in my judgment, is authentic, dynamic and
constructive.
Id. See also 124 CONG. RFc. 15,448 (1978) (statement of Rep. Won Pat) (there has been a
"rise in Filipino nationalism and a corresponding rise in anti-Americanism, especially in the
press and among the Filipino leadership").
63. 1979 Amendments, supra note 61, at 868 (Joint Statement of Philippine President
Marcos and United States Vice President Mondale).
64. Id. at 886.
65. Memorandum of Agreement, June 1, 1983, United States-Philippines, art. I, T.I.A.S.
No. 10699 [hereinafter 1983 Memorandum].
66. Id. art. I.
67. Id. arts, II-III.
68. Id. art. V. The 1947 Agreement vests the United States with exclusive jurisdiction in
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Military Bases Agreement Joint Committee, composed of one representa-
tive from each government and their staff, was established as a consulta-
tion body on the implementation of Agreement provisions that cannot be
resolved between the Philippine base commander and the United States
facilities commanders.6 9
President Ronald Reagan agreed to make his best efforts to provide
a security assistance package of $900 million for the 1984-88 period.7"
E. Future Negotiations
In September 1986, a special Philippine presidential commission
drafting a new constitution voted against a constitutional ban on the
presence of American military bases.71 Instead, the commission left to
President Corazon Aquino the decision whether to renegotiate the
Agreement. The Philippine Congress has also been given a major role in
the approval of any new treaty. In a section on transitory provisions, a
clause provides that after the Agreement expires in 1991, "'foreign mili-
tary bases, troops or facilities shall not be allowed in any Philippine terri-
tory except in accordance with a new treaty duly concurred by the
(Philippine) Senate and, when Congress so requires, ratified by the people
in a referendum or plebiscite called for that purpose.' "72 Philippine and
American negotiators are expected to begin discussing a possible renewal
of the Agreement in 1988.71
The evolution of the agreements from the pre-independence era to
the present illustrates the United States' gradual recognition of Philip-
pine sovereignty over the base lands. It also demonstrates a shift in bar-
gaining powers such that the two countries are currently on more equal
footing.
III. MILITARY BASE AGREEMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
Underlying the Agreement's removal issue is the question of what
time of war. 1947 Agreement, supra note 4, art. XIII. See also 1983 Hearings, supra note 1, at
287-88.
69. 1983 Memorandum, supra note 65, art. VII.
70. See Bases Agreement Review, supra note 58, at 21. The 1984-88 appropriations for the
Philippines were in the following amounts:
Military Assistance $125,000,000
Foreign Military Sales Credits $300,000,000
Economic Support Fund Assistance $475,000,000
Id.
71. L.A. Times, Sept. 19, 1986, pt. I, at 12, col. 1.
72. Id. at cols. 2-3.
73. Id. at col. 4.
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legal framework to use in construing the provisions, or for that matter,
what law in general should apply to military base agreements. This sec-
tion examines the application of a private law analogy to military base
agreements.
International law is not an isolated system of jurisprudence. Article
38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice provides that the
sources of law available for the adjudication of disputes between nations
include "the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.
'7 4
It is said the intention of this clause is "to authorise [sic] the Court to
apply the general principles of municipal jurisprudence, in particular of
private law, in so far as they are applicable to relations of States.""
To the extent the law of "civilized nations" contributes to interna-
tional law, points of contact between the law of nations and private law
may be established.76 Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, formerly of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, suggested that one such point of contact is where
legal adjudication between states involves the application of the analogy
of easements or servitudes in private law to construe treaty restrictions
upon territorial sovereignty.77
A majority of commentators have found the legal nature of private
law contracts and international treaties to be "essentially the same, and
[the] fundamental identity of contracts and treaties is the usual basis of
the exposition of the law of treaties. ' 78 Indeed, Lord McNair said that
the development of the treaty as a concept in international law has been
indebted to the contract of private law.7 9
The acquisition of sovereignty over land, sea and territorial waters is
an area of international law which lends itself to the applicability of pri-
vate law concepts. 80
74. 1977 U.N.Y.B. 1190, 1193, U.N. Sales No. E.79.I.1.
75. A. VAMVOUKOS, TERMINATION OF TREATIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 31 (1985).
76. H. LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW SOURCES AND ANALOGIES OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 3 (1970).
77. Id.
78. F. NoZARI, UNEQUAL TREATIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 126 (1971). Some writers
who agree with this concept are Grotius, Triepel, Brierly and Lauterpacht. Id. at 126-30. See
generally H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 76.
79. McNair, The Functions and Differing Legal Character of Treaties, 1930 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 100, 106. A major exception to the principle that treaties be treated like private law
contracts is the fact that freedom of consent of the parties has traditionally not been an essen-
tial condition of treaty validity. H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 76, at 155. This consent excep-
tion as a ground for the invalidation of treaties has thus led to the debates over the unequal
treaty concept. See infra text accompanying notes 93-101.
80. H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 76, at 91. A distinction was made between leases of a
purely private law type and those of a "disguised cession" type. However, since the political or
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A. International Leases
Just as property rights which fall short of title may be created in
private law, property rights may be created in international law with re-
spect to a state's territory. Thus a state may lease to another a portion of
its territory for a term of years."1
There are two categories of leases in international law. The first is of
a purely private law type, where rent is paid for leased land, to be used
for certain purposes for a term of years.8 2 The other type is in the nature
of "political" leases, or cessions disguised for the purpose of rendering a
permanent loss of territory more palatable to the dispossessed state.83
The 1947 Agreement seems to be in the nature of a quasi-political
lease. While it cannot be called a purely private lease since no rent is
paid, 4 neither can it be called a purely "political" lease, since the loss of
territory is not meant to be permanent. Between the two types, however,
the 1947 Agreement leans toward a "political" lease. The original
ninety-nine year grant of base territories was similar to a grant in
perpetuity, and Philippine independence was arguably qualified by it.
Certainly, the Agreement established an ongoing treaty of alliance be-
tween the United States and the Philippines.
The United States judiciary has recognized that leased territories for
naval bases do not become territories of the United States. In Vermilya-
Brown Co. v. Connell, 5 the United States Supreme Court considered
whether the Fair Labor Standards Act covered American employees con-
structing a military base in Bermuda on land leased from Great Britain
for ninety-nine years. In dictum, the majority also resolved the issue of
whether the United States or Panama had sovereignty over the Canal
Zone and decided that the Canal Zone was "admittedly territory over
which we do not have sovereignty."8 6 However, Congress has the power
to regulate employment conditions of American citizens outside the terri-
torial jurisdiction of the United States. 7
"disguised" lease is achieved by enforcing the will of only one of the parties, it is not soundly
based in law. Id. at 185.
81. Examples of leases include the United Kingdom's lease over Hong Kong for 99 years
or the treaty between the United States and Panama for the use of the Panama Canal. See
generally J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER & N. LEECH, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 775-
76 (1981).
82. H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 76, at 183-84.
83. Id. at 184-85. See also J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 189 (1963).
84. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
85. 335 U.S. 377 (1948).
86. Id. at 381.
87. Id. at 389-90. The State Department has also rejected the suggestion that such bases
are United States possessions. See United States v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217 (1949), where the
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In the present Agreement, the United States has possession of the
bases, but the Philippines retains title and reversion rights to the land. In
a 1953 opinion, United States Attorney General Herbert Brownell ad-
vised the Secretary of State that the United States retained title in the
base lands. Philippine Senator Claro M. Recto rebutted this in a 1954
memorandum, in which he stated that this assertion by the United States
long after the recognition of independence was "not only in plain contra-
vention of the unambiguous terms of the Treaty of General Relations and
the Bases Agreement, but... irreconcilable with the traditional Ameri-
can policy toward the Philippines."88 Instead, Recto stated that the right
of the United States in the base territories is only a " 'jus utendi' and...
the transaction covered by the Bases Agreement is a 'lease.' "89 Later,
the United States recognized the correctness of the Philippine position
and Vice President Richard Nixon went to the Philippines to deliver for-
mally the muniments of title to the base lands."
B. The Unequal Treaty Concept
1. In general
The legal nature of private law contracts and international law trea-
ties is essentially the same.91 Unconscionable or adhesion contracts in
Court stated: "'The arrangements under which the leased bases were acquired.., did not and
were not intended to transfer sovereignty over the leased areas from Great Britain to the
United States.' Id. at 219 (quoting Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377, 380
(1948)). But see In re Guzman and Latamble, 7 Ann. Dig. 112 (Supreme Court of Cuba 1934)
(the Supreme Court of Cuba held that the Guantanamo naval base was foreign territory vis-a-
vis Cuba). See also Note, Legal Aspects of the Panama Canal Zone-In Perspective, 45 B.U.L.
REv. 64, 74-75 (1965) for a discussion of Vermilya-Brown Co.
88. V. ABAD SANTOS, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 216
(1966).
89. Id. In support of his opinion, Recto stated in part:
The term "use" in its ordinary and legal acceptation (whether in the common
law or civil law) is not synonymous with title or dominion. It connotes a right in-
cluded in, and therefore inferior to, title or ownership.
... [The right of the United States in the base lands is only a "jus utendi" and
... the transaction covered by the Bases Agreement is a "lease." . . . From the
standpoint of our municipal law, however, the right of the United States to use the
bases free of rent resembles the contract of commodatum or the servitude of use. The
comparison might help in understanding the view that Philippine ownership of the
bases is not incompatible with the United States right to maintain and operate them.
Id. "Jus utendi" refers to the "right to use property without destroying its substance."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 779 (5th ed. 1979).
90. Id. at 217. It is unclear whether or not the United States possessed formal documents
or title apart from the Treaty of Paris of 1898. As such, the muniments of title here were
probably in the nature of a quitclaim deed.
91. H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 76, at 156. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying
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private law are transactions in which the inequality of bargaining power
between parties allows one party unconscionably to take advantage of the
other. Such contracts are reviewable by the courts to determine their
reasonableness. Any unreasonable provision will be unenforceable.92
In international law, the "unequal treaty" concept has been invoked
as a ground for the avoidance of treaties. "Unequal treaties" have been
defined based on two fundamental principles: sovereign equality among
contracting parties and reciprocity for treaty rights and obligations. 93
The sovereign equality of states is a generally accepted principle of
international law.94 At the 1968-69 Vienna Conference on the Law of
Treaties, it was recognized that this principle "involved a new approach
to the problem of unequal treaties obtained by coercion .... In accord-
ance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, a treaty
procured by the threat or use of force in any form was void."95 Some
countries have claimed that unequal treaties imposed by powerful states
on weak states were tools of imperialism for acquiring territories. 96 As
92. See Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 357 (1873), where the Supreme
Court found that contracts carriers made with customers to limit their liability were good in so
far as they were reasonable. However, if such contracts went against public policy and totally
excused the carriers for negligence, then "the inequality of the parties, the compulsion under
which the customer is placed, and the obligations of the carrier to the public, operate with full
force to divest the transaction of validity." Id. at 381-82.
The principle of the inequality of bargaining power was further set down by Justice
Frankfurter in his dissenting opinion in United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289
(1942):
It is said that familiar principles would be outraged if Bethlehem were denied recov-
ery on these contracts. But... [d]oes any principle in our law have more universal
application than the doctrine that courts will not enforce transactions in which rela-
tive positions of the parties are such that one has unconscionably taken advantage of
the necessities of the other?
Id. at 326 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Justice Frankfurter further recognized that apart from
fraud and physical duress, other grounds upon which courts could refuse to enforce contracts
were situations "in which one party has unjustly taken advantage of the economic necessities
of the other." Id. (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
93. L. CHEN, supra note 46, at 31.
94. There is a growing consensus that the principle of sovereign equality of states as em-
bodied in the United Nations Charter has developed into a peremptory norm of international
law. Cf. Schwelb, Some Aspects of International Jus Cogens as Formulated by the Interna-
tional Law Commission, 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 946, 960-61 (1967); Sinclair, Vienna Conference on
the Law of Treaties, 19 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 47, 66-67 (1970).
95. United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, Summary records of the plenary
meetings and of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole (Mar. 26-May 24, 1968) at 280,
U.N. Doc. A/Conf.39/l 1, U.N. Sales No. E.68.V.7 (1969) [hereinafter Conference Summary
Records].
96. In an effort to offset the domination of other European powers, the Soviet Union has
frequently challenged the validity of unequal treaties. Stalin once said that "[t]he capitalist
powers... do not conclude equal treaties with small nations because they do not regard them
as their equals." L. CHEN, supra note 46, at 29. China found the notion of unequal treaties
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such, this concept has frequently been invoked to serve political pur-
poses. The problem with this approach has been and continues to be the
vagueness of the "use of force" requirement. Two schools of thought
were presented at the Vienna Conference on interpreting the "use of
force" requirement. One school would confine the definition of coercion
to physical or military force, while the other school would expand it to
include political and economic pressure.
97
Based on the reciprocity of rights and obligations established by a
treaty's provisions, unequal treaties have been defined as "those in which
the parties do not reciprocally promise to each other the same things, or
things equivalent." 8 Examples of such treaties frequently relate to eco-
nomic matters or cessions of territory.99 For instance, Article 3 of the
1946 Trade Agreement between the United States and the Philippines
imposed a ceiling on Philippine goods entering the United States but no
useful in her attempt to eliminate unilateral obligations imposed on it by the European powers
in the 1920's and 1930's. Id.
97. Those arguing that only physical or military force constitute coercion found support in
preparatory work done on the United Nations Charter in which the proposal for including
economic pressure was rejected. Moreover, they argued that the concept of political and eco-
nomic pressure was too vague and its existence could not easily be determined. L. CHEN,
supra note 46, at 42-44; see Conference Summary Records, supra note 95, at 282-83.
On the other hand, those adopting the latter view contended that nonmilitary forms of
pressure are "often more intense in their effect than military force," and to confine the concept
of coercion to physical force might fail to eliminate situations in which the principle of sover-
eign equality of states might be frustrated. L. CHEN, supra note 46, at 44-46; see Conference
Summary Records, supra note 95, at 287.
It is also unclear who decides whether certain political or economic pressures present at a
treaty's inception conflict with the United Nations Charter. The answer inevitably leads back
to the views of the contracting parties (or at least one of them). Ingrid Detter, a Talbot Re-
search Fellow at Oxford, suggested it may serve purposes better to look to the actual contents
of a treaty for grounds of voidance. She said that "the very contents of a treaty ought to be
examined when the question of validity is discussed: the material contents of the instrument
ought to be accepted as a separate ground of voidance, irrespective of whether the treaty had
been concluded under force." Detter, The Problem of Unequal Treaties, 15 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 1069, 1086 (1966).
98. L. CHEN, supra note 46, at 28 (quoting E. DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 199
(1858)). "If the performance of a treaty tends to give one of the contracting parties more
nonreciprocal privileges or advantages than the 'fair intent and definite grant of the treaty' has
warranted, then such a treaty may fall into the category of unequal treaty." Id. at 49.
The existence or nonexistence of reciprocity has been used to distinguish equal from une-
qual treaties. The principle of reciprocity finds expression in the Roman law's maxim do ut es
(reciprocity, counterpart) or in the Anglo-American rule of quidpro quo (consideration). Rec-
iprocity requires that a treaty be concluded on the basis of "mutual advantages that consider
the interests of all contrasting parties, not some or one of the parties .... On the basis of
reciprocity a contrasting party is willing to grant similar or identical privilege to the other
parties." Id. at 33-34.
99. For examples of unequal treaties, see F. NOZARI, supra note 78, at 201-30.
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similar restriction on American goods entering the Philippines. 1°°
Treaties concerning cession of territory by one contracting party are
sometimes considered unequal treaties. Other matters such as the use of
international rivers, rights of passage, railway access, leased territories
(perpetual or temporary) and military bases are also the favorite objects
of unequal treaty claims.101 Military base agreements in particular seem
to inherently conflict with the idea of sovereignty.
2. In relation to military base agreements
In United Nations General Assembly sessions, military base agree-
ments have often been condemned as "unequal."10 2 Although the term
"unequal treaty" has not been used in the International Law Commis-
sion's draft articles or reports, member states have used the term in com-
menting on military base disputes.103 Needless to say, the concept was
neither well recognized nor popular in the days of colonization.
During the twentieth century colonial era, superpowers secured alli-
ance treaties for their own advantage. "[I]t was not unusual that at the
time of state succession the successor states were forced to enter into new
agreements for recognizing the political advantages which had been en-
joyed by the colonial powers."' 4 Some classic examples were the British
treaties of alliance with Egypt, Transjordan, and Iraq, and the French
treaties with Morocco and Tunisia.10
The United States has had its own share of discomfort over military
bases in Morocco, the West Indies, Bahrain and Cuba.10 6 Realizing that
100. Agreement on Trade and Related Matters, July 4, 1946, United States-Philippines, art.
III, 61 Stat. 2611, T.I.A.S. No. 1588. Article V also restricted freedom to change the value of
the Philippine peso in relation to the United States dollar. Id. art. V. This agreement has been
subject to criticism as an unequal treaty. L. CHEN, supra note 46, at 39.
101. L. CHEN, supra note 46, at 38.
102. The General Assembly held an extra session in 1961 to discuss the dispute between
France and Tunisia concerning the French military base in Bizerta. The Czechoslovakian
delegate stated that "one-sided agreements for the location of military bases on foreign territo-
ries have been concluded, and are operating, under conditions which are at complete variance
with the generally recognized principles of international law." 3 U.N. GAOR (1000th plen.
mtg.) at 58, U.N. Doe. A/PV.1000 (1961).
Before the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly in 1963, the Ukrainian representa-
tive gave military base and military assistance treaties as examples of unequal treaties, since
"[m]ilitary personnel stationed in a foreign country under some treaties of that type enjoyed
virtually unlimited privileges and immunities, while the host country virtually surrendered all
sovereignty over the bases." 18 U.N. GAOR C.6 (784th mtg.) at 18, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/
SR.784 (1963).
103. F. NOZARI, supra note 78, at 115.
104. L. CHEN, supra note 46, at 54.
105. See id. at 54-59.
106. See id. at 59-64. The unequal aspect of the base agreement was highlighted in the case
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base agreements could be viewed by the international commmunity as an
attempt to maintain the colonial status of a newly independent state, the
United States has tried to negotiate with the colonial peoples, establish-
ing the continuity of bases by new agreements rather than succession. 
0 7
American efforts to secure the consent of new states indicate the
importance of formalizing a new agreement to maintain the United
States' political advantage in these countries. Indeed, the United Nations
General Assembly has maintained that, based on the sovereign equality
of states, only the public expression of free consent on the part of states
concerned may make the stationing of foreign forces acceptable as an
exception to the sovereign equality principle."8
It is arguable that the colonial relationship between the United
States and the Philippines in the pre-independence years makes the
whole agreement voidable under the unequal treaty concept, thus also
invalidating the removal provisions. A few days before passage of the
1934 Tydings-McDuffie Act, an author of some of the pre-Tydings drafts
commented:
It may be ... that an objectionable and indeed obnoxious plan
might be accepted if the Filipinos were convinced that complete
and immediate independence could not be obtained. The Phil-
ippines are dominated by the United States, and their inhabit-
ants realize that they can obtain only what this Government
grants. Their political status makes equal opportunities for
bargaining impossible. They must take that which is given
them. 109
Subsequently, the Philippines agreed to the 1947 Agreement along with
of the West Indies base the United States obtained under a British lease. A former legal advi-
sor to the United States Army pointed out the inappropriateness of insisting on West Indies'
succession to the agreement:
The United States could ... demand on valid legal grounds that ... the West Indies
Federation be required to accept the U.K. obligations under the Agreement.... It
could refuse to recognize the West Indies Federation upon its independence if it did
not assume the obligations of the Leased Bases Agreement. Action of this nature,
however, would undoubtedly have repercussions, for it would in all probability be
viewed by the international community... as an attempt to continue to subject the
West Indies to ... a colonial status.
Esgain, "Military Servitudes and the New Nations," The New Nations in International Law
and Diplomacy, 1965 Y.B. WORLD POLITY 42, 78.
107. L. CHEN, supra note 46, at 61-62. This technique as applied in the West Indies pro-
duced the Defense Areas Agreement of 1961 between the two countries. Id. at 62.
108. The General Assembly in Resolution 41(I) urged the members "to undertake the...
withdrawal ... of their armed forces stationed in the territories of Members without their
consent freely and publicly expressed in ... agreements consistent with the Charter." G.A.
Res. 41(I), U.N. Doc. A/64, at 66 (1946). See also L. CHEN, supra note 46, at 257 nn.62 & 63.
109. 77 CONG. REc. 3471 (1934) (remarks of Sen. King).
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its independence, at a time when the country was in no meaningful eco-
nomic or military position to reject the package of aid and agreements
the United States was offering, even if it wanted. It is true that the Phil-
ippines benefitted from United States postwar rehabilitation funds and
assistance, but this justly compensated the Philippine role in a war pri-
marily fought between America and the Axis Powers. The influx of aid
did not change the countries' bargaining positions.
Apart from inequality in the bargaining positions between the two
countries at the inception of the Agreement, the 1947 Agreement in itself
does not provide for reciprocal rights or obligations. Amendments to the
1947 Agreement's provisions through the decades indicate that attempts
have been made to change this lack of reciprocity. It is likely that issues
concerning extraterritorial jurisdiction and "rent" will continue to
plague the Agreement's negotiations until a new treaty is executed.
However solid it may seem, the United States is not likely to accept
an "unequal treaty" argument. One element that might invalidate a
treaty is duress against the signer.' In the case of the Filipinos, there is
no evidence that Philippine President Manuel Roxas was under duress
when he signed the 1947 Agreement. Another element would be undue
influence on account of the unequal legal status or actual power of the
parties."' The legislative history of the Agreement arguably demon-
strates the unequal power between the two countries. However, this ele-
ment has traditionally not been recognized as tainting international
agreements.' 12 Moreover, the current disposition of international law is
such that the unequal treaty theory is unlikely to have any practical
effect."1
3
It should still be considered that only the public expression of free
consent as suggested by the General Assembly will serve to quell clamors
110. Lester, supra note 13, at 850-51.
111. Id. at 851.
112. Id.
113. International law is in a developing process, however, and documents drafted in the
late 1960's to 1980's evince a shift from traditional rejection of the unequal treaty argument.
See, e.g., Report of the 1966 Special Committee on Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States, 21 U.N. GAOR at 172-73, U.N. Doc. A/
6230 (1966) (the right of states to remove foreign military bases from their territory was con-
sidered essential to formulate the principle of sovereign equality of states); Declaration on the
Prohibition of Military, Political or Economic Coercion in the Conclusion of Treaties, adopted
by United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, Mar. 26-May 24, 1968 and Apr. 9-May
22, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.39/26, at 285; Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States,
Dec. 12, 1974, art. 16, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 53, U.N. Doc. A/9631 [hereinafter
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States] ("It is the right and duty of all States... to
eliminate.., all forms of foreign.., occupation and domination, and the economic and social
consequences thereof, as a prerequisite for development.").
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that any military bases agreement negotiated in the future is "une-
qual." ' The following section establishes that political circumstances
surrounding the drafting of the 1947 Agreement will have a bearing on
legal construction of the present removal provisions.
IV. VIENNA CONVENTION RULES AND CONSTRUCTION OF THE
REMOVAL PROVISIONS
Recent political upheavals in the Philippines have led to the evalua-
tion of alternative base sites1 15 and the costs of moving to such sites.'
1 6
Assuming that either government chooses to give notice of termination,
one question this Comment addresses is what constitutes "removable im-
provements, equipment or facilities" and "buildings and structures"
within the provisions of the 1947 Agreement which permit their removal
before expiration of the Agreement. This Comment also addresses re-
lated questions dealing with the time in which the removal right must be
exercised and whether the Philippines has a duty to pay compensation
should base facilities be left behind.
Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention provides that a treaty shall
be interpreted "in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to
be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its
object and purpose." 117 The context includes the text of the treaty, sub-
sequent agreements or practices in the interpretation or application of its
provisions, other agreements relating to the treaty, and any relevant rules
of international law." 8 Article 32 provides recourse to the preparatory
114. The "public expression of free consent" requirement might be in the form of a public
referendum held in the receiving state. For example, Spain recently held a public referendum
in which the people approved Spain's continuing alliance with NATO. Serrill, A Stunning
Win for NATO, TIME, Mar. 24, 1986, at 44. In a similar vein, President Aquino has said she
plans to call a referendum to allow the Filipino people to decide the future of the base installa-
tions. Wall St. J., Apr. 11, 1986, at 1, col. 3.
115. See L. NIKSCH, PHILIPPINE BASES: How IMPORTANT TO U.S. INTERESTS IN ASIA?
11 (The Library of Congress Issue Brief No. IB79041, 1980); Chappell, US. security and the
Philippines: an exchange, 41 BULL. OF THE ATOM. SCIENTISTS 38 (1985); Deming, How Vul-
nerable are the Bases?, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 4, 1985, at 32; Sterba, America's Philippine Bases:
Vital, or Just Convenient?, Wall St. J., Feb. 20, 1986, at 26, col. 2; Tumer, Alternatives Abound
for Clark Field and Subic Bay, L.A. Times, Feb. 2, 1986, pt. V, at 5, col. 4; Sterba, Pacific Pit
Stop: Philippine Rumblings Imperil Bases that are Ideal for U.S. Military, Wall St. J., Sept. 4,
1985, at 1, col. I [hereinafter Pacific Pit Stop].
116. See 1986 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 10; S. 2078, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG.
REc. S1410 (1986) (a bill to direct the Secretary of Defense, for contingency planning pur-
poses, to conduct an investigation on the feasibility and cost of relocating the military in the
Philippines to alternative sites in the Pacific region).
117. Vienna Convention, supra note 12, art. 31.
118. Id. art. 31 (2)-(3). See I. SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF
TREATIES 114-54 (1984).
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work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion when interpre-
tation under Article 31 leaves the meaning ambiguous or leads to an un-
reasonable result.' 19
It is clear that interpretation of the 1947 Agreement's provisions in
good faith should not lead to a manifestly absurd or unreasonable re-
sult.'20 The following sections examine other elements such as the ordi-
nary meaning of the terms, the context of the treaty, subsequent or
related agreements and prepatory work.
A. Ordinary Meaning: Comparing American and Philippine Law
Article XVII of the 1947 Agreement provides the United States
with the right to remove "any or all removable improvements, equipment
or facilities" without any export tax being charged on material re-
moved. 121 It also provides for the removal of "[a]ll buildings and struc-
tures" before relinquishment of the base on which the structures are
situated or before expiration of the Agreement. 2 2 The "ordinary mean-
ing" of these terms must be examined under both American and Philip-
pine law.
While the United States follows the common law system, the Philip-
pines has a mixed common law and civil law system. The Spanish Civil
Code is the original basis of Philippine jurisprudence. 123 Although An-
glo-American common law has had a great influence on Philippine law in
general, 124 the law of property has only been modified to a limited ex-
tent.125 In terminology, the civil law classification of things as movables
119. Vienna Convention, supra note 12, art. 32.
120. I. SINCLAIR, supra note 118, at 120. Applying good faith to the interpretation of trea-
ties derives from the rule ofpacta suntservanda, or good faith in the observance of treaties. Id.
at 119.
121. 1947 Agreement, supra note 4, art. XVII, para. 1.
122. Id. art. XVII, para. 2.
123. Cuyugan, Origin and Development of Philippine Jurisprudence, 3 PHILIPPINE L.J. 205
(1917).
124. The Philippine Supreme Court has said that "[tjhe jurisprudence of this jurisdiction is
based upon the English Common Law in its present day form of Anglo-American Common
Law to an almost exclusive extent." In re Shoop, 41 Phil. 213 (1920), reprinted in R. SCHLES-
INGER, COMPARATIVE LAW 222, 235 (1980). See also Cuyugan, supra note 123, at 191.
"Since the advent of American sovereignty... immense modifications in our Spanish substan-
tive law have been effected either expressly or by necessary implication .... [S]uffice it to say
that the Anglo-American jurisprudence has exerted a tremendous influence on our present
jurisprudence." Id. at 198.
125. Cuyugan, supra note 123, at 206. American common law modified provisions on pre-
scriptions, the Spanish Mortgage Law, the Torrens System and other property-related acts.
Id. However, "Spanish-derived substantive private law never suffered wholesale abrogation."
R. SCHLESINGER, supra note 124, at 237.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:421
or immovables has been retained.' 26 Decisions of the Philippine
Supreme Court have frequently shown that despite differences in termi-
nology and technique, application of the common law and civil law may
ultimately reach identical results.'27 If the domestic law of both coun-
tries is founded on common principles, one might conclude that both
countries will implicitly negotiate with that common understanding in
mind.
1. "removable improvements, equipment or facilities"
American common law provides a broad and comprehensive read-
ing of the terms "removable improvements, equipment or facilities."
"Improvements" refers to additions or betterments of real property
which enhance the value of the property.'28 "Equipment" refers to "any-
thing used in equipping;.., the articles comprising an outfit... ; tools,
machinery, implements, appliances" and is usually considered movable
property.129 "Facilities" embraces "everything which aids or makes eas-
ier the performance of the activities involved in the business of the person
or the corporation."'
' 3 0
Philippine law has almost identical definitions of these terms, refer-
ring to "equipment" as the "[m]aterials or articles used in equipping... ;
the articles comprised in an outfit," and in industry, physical facilities
including machineries and tools.' 3 1 "Improvements" refers to "valua-
ble additions or betterments," and in a building, the term "compre-
hend[s] everything that tends to enhance the value or convenience of
such property."' 132 Similarly, "facilities" is a term broad enough to have
a similar definition in common law.
The word "removable" seems to apply to each of the terms. This
implies that some "improvements, equipment or facilities" are not re-
movable, or that they have become so attached to the land that they
should be considered immovables or fixtures. Fixtures law provides that
some things or chattels have become so much a part of the land that they
126. M. GAMBOA, AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILIPPINE LAW 152 (1955).
127. R. SCHLESINGER, supra note 124, at 236.
128. 42 C.LS. Improvements § 1 (1944); see also Annotation, What Constitutes Improve-
ments, Alterations, or Additions Within Provisions of Lease Permitting or Prohibiting Tenants
Removal thereof at Termination of Lease, 30 A.L.R. 3D 998 (1970).
129. 30 C.J.S. Equipment (1965).
130. 35 C.J.S. Facility (1960).
131. F. MORENO, PHILIPPINE LAW DICTIONARY 211 (1982).
132. Id. at 292-93.
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may pass by conveyance as part of the land.133
In American common law, whether chattels have become fixtures
depends on three elements: (1) actual or constructive annexation to the
realty; (2) appropriation to the purpose for which land is used; and (3)
the objective intention of the annexer that the chattel become a fixture.
134
Philippine property law, based on the civil law system,1 35 appears
more specific and divides things into movables and immovables.
Whether a particular object is movable or not depends on "whether it is
capable of being carried from place to place; ... whether such change in
location can be made without injury to the immovable to which it may be
attached; and .. whether the object ... fall[s] within any of the ten
classes of immovables." 136 Philippine law does not define immovables;
rather, it enumerates them. The list includes buildings, roads and
docks. 137
In the 1947 Agreement, it may well be a question of fact as to which
"improvements, equipment or facilities" are removable. Chairs, tables
and beds have been recognized as "removable" chattels138 while build-
ings and houses have been recognized as fixtures.1 39 However, in Hughes
v. Kershow,14 a Colorado court recognized that a five-story brick build-
ing constructed by the tenant was covered by a provision in the lease that
"all erections and improvements and repairs" made by the tenant were to
remain personal property and could be removed by him within sixty days
before the expiration of the lease.141 The main limitation seems to be
that a fixture removal may be prevented where such removal would do
substantial damage to the leased premises.142 Causing injury to the arti-
cle or structure, but not to the realty, does not destroy the right of
133. See 0. BROWDER, R. CUNNINGHAM & A. SMITH, BASIC PROPERTY LAW 510 (1984)
[hereinafter 0. BROWDER].
134. R. BOYER, SURVEY OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 328 (1981). The third element in-
volves an objective intention to be inferred from such factors as the nature of the article, the
relation and situation of the annexer, and the purpose for which the annexation is made. Id. at
328-29. This intent element is often said to be the most compelling factor in determining
whether a fixture remains removable or becomes part of the realty. See Union Bldg. Co. v.
Pennell, 78 F.2d 959 (3d Cir. 1935).
135. Spanish jurisprudence finds its roots in the Roman civil law system, which was in turn
extended to its colony, the Philippines. Cuyugan, supra note 123, at 200-05.
136. M. GAMBOA, supra note 126, at 155.
137. PHIL. CIV. CODE art. 415 (1980).
138. R. BOYER, supra note 134, at 327.
139. 0. BROWDER, supra note 133, at 510.
140. 42 Colo. 210, 93 P. 1116 (1908).
141. Id. at 210, 93 P. at 1116.
142. 0. BROWDER, supra note 133, at 511.
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removal. 
143
In a similar vein, the Philippine Civil Code's list of immovable prop-
erty includes "[e]verything attached to an immovable... in such a way
that it cannot be separated therefrom without breaking the material or
deterioration of the object." 144 The right to remove all "equipment or
facilities" may further be limited by the fact that the Civil Code includes
"[m]achinery... intended ... for an industry" on its list of immov-
ables. 145 Thus ship repair, aircraft maintenance, and communication and
radar facilities are arguably immovable property which were intended to
meet the needs of the military defense industry. Should these facilities be
left, it may help the Philippines develop their own military defense indus-
try in the future.
It should also be noted that Article XVII(1) sets no time limit for
removal. The absence of a time requirement means that "removable im-
provements, equipment or facilities" may be removed subsequent to expi-
ration of the Agreement, perhaps even after the United States forces have
surrendered possession of the bases.
2. "buildings and structures"
The problem of ambiguity occurs in construing what the right to
remove all "buildings and structures... erected by the United States""'
actually entails. The term "buildings" is ambiguous since it has no uni-
versal meaning but depends on the circumstances or the intentions of the
parties for its meaning. 4 Ordinarily, however, the term refers to a
structure enclosing a space within walls and a roof.'4 The word usually
refers to the entire building, unless qualifying words are used. 49 "Struc-
ture" is one of the broadest terms in the English language and can mean
"any object constructed or installed by man, including, but without limi-
tation, buildings [and] towers."'5 0 In the broadest sense, it can mean
143. 36A C.J.S. Fixtures § 22 (1961). See also 0. BROWDER, supra note 133, at 511 ("Obvi-
ously this means damage other than the loss of the fixture itself").
144. PHIL. CIV. CODE art. 415(3). "Under this paragraph, for the incorporated thing to be
considered realty property, the injury or breakage or deterioration in case of separation, must
be SUBSTANTIAL." 2 PHIL. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 415, Comment 5 (1981).
145. PHIL. CIV. CODE art. 415(5).
146. 1947 Agreement, supra note 4, art. XVII, para. 2.
147. 12 C.J.S. Building (1980).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 50485.1 (West 1983). It can include such things as ditches,
drains, embankments, roads, shafts, tunnels and power lines. Western Elec. Co. v. Colley, 79
Cal. App. 770, 251 P. 331 (1926) (quoting Mendoza v. Central Forest Co., 37 Cal. App. 289,
295, 174 P. 359, 361 (1918)).
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"any production or piece of work artificially built up, or composed of
parts joined together in some definite manner." 151
Arguably, the right to remove all "buildings" is limited by the fact
that the Philippine Civil Code considers buildings to be immovables, pro-
vided that they are more or less of a permanent structure and there has
been the intent of permanent annexation.152 In Ladera v. Hodges,1 3 the
Philippine Court of Appeals decided that a true building that was not
"merely superposed on the soil" was immovable or real property,
whether a building was erected by the owner of the land or by a lessee.154
Since buildings are immovables, it would seem inconsistent to allow their
removal. The United States can validly claim, however, that the Agree-
ment has expressly provided for the removal of buildings, whether or not
there was original intent to permanently annex these buildings.
The lack of any qualifying words beside the term "structures" is
particularly disturbing even as it provides the United States with a broad
and flexible removal right. The provision allowing the removal of all
"structures" seems to permit total destruction of the bases, from the
roads and runways to the docks and towers. Allowing the United States
such a broad privilege reinforces the view that the rights accorded by the
1947 Agreement were not reciprocal. Further, such a broad removal
right does not take into account any future interest the Philippines may
have in developing the same property.
The right of removal could be limited to some extent by excluding
the immovables listed under the Philippine Civil Code. Thus "struc-
tures" should not be construed to encompass immovables such as: (1)
"roads and constructions adhered to the soil"; (2) trees or plants at-
tached to the land; (3) objects for use or ornamentation placed in build-
ings or on lands in a manner that reveals the United States' intention to
attach them permanently; (4) machinery or instruments intended by the
United States for an industry or works and which tend to meet the needs
of such industry; (5) docks and floating structures intended by their na-
ture to remain at a fixed placed on a river, lake or coast; and (6) contracts
for public works, servitudes and other real rights over immovable
property.15 5
151. 83 C.J.S. Structure (1953).
152. 2 PHIL. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 415, comment (3)(b).
153. Judgment of Sept. 23, 1952, Court of Appeals, Philippines, 48 Official Gazette 5374.
154. Id. at 5380.
155. PHIL. Civ. CODE art. 415. The list also comprises in part:
1) Land, buildings...;
3) Everything attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a way that it
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The civil law classification of movables and immovables may corre-
spond roughly with common law personalty and realty in determining
the "ordinary meaning" of terms, but should the application of the two
systems prove slightly divergent, civil law principles should properly take
precedence. A well-recognized rule in conflict of laws is the situs rule,
where the laws of the location of the property govern the rights of the
parties.156 The Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws refers almost
every question concerning "immovables" to the law of the situs of the
realty.157 Thus by analogy, since the bases are on Philippine territory,
Philippine civil law should apply.
In the arbitration ofAspinwall v. Venezuela, 158 the United States and
Venezuelan Claims Commission decided that "'where language is em-
ployed in a treaty which is susceptible of two meanings, "that is to be
preferred which is least for the advantage of the party for whose benefit
the clause is inserted."' . 9 This suggests that the removal provision
will more likely be construed against the United States, for whose benefit
Article XVII was included.
Finally, Roman civil law has been cited as the philosophical basis of
international law.16 0 American commentators have said that "the
greater number of controversies between States would find a just solution
in [the Roman civil law's] comprehensive system of practical equity,
which furnishes principles of universal jurisprudence." '161 The terms "re-
cannot be separated therefrom without breaking the material or deterioration of the
object;
5) .. [R]eeeptacles ... or implements intended.., for an industry or works
which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly
to meet the needs of the said industry or works;
6) Animal houses ... or breeding places of similar nature.. .; the animals in
these places are included;
8) Mines, quarries, and slag dumps, while the matter thereof forms part of the
bed, and waters either running or stagnant.
Id.
156. Justice Story stated over a century ago that "'the laws of the place, where such [real]
property is situate, exclusively govern in respect to the rights of the parties, the modes of
transfer, and the solemnities, which should accompany them.'" R. WEINTRAUB, COMMEN-
TARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 398 (1980) (quoting J. STORY, CONFLICTS OF LAW § 424,
at 708 (3d ed. 1846)).
157. R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 156, at 296-97.
158. Aspinwall v. Venezuela (United States v. Venezuela), No. 18, Dec. 5, 1885, reprinted
in 4 J. MOORE, HISTORY AND DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS TO WHICH
THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN A PARTY 3616 (1898).
159. Id. at 3624.
160. H. TAYLOR, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC LAW 20-21 (1901).
161. H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 76, at 30.
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movable improvements, equipment or facilities," or "buildings and struc-
tures" ought to be interpreted consistent with the civil law concepts of
movables and immovables.
Other matters that Article XVII(2) of the 1947 Agreement refers to
are the time limit within which the "buildings and structures" may be
removed and the duty of compensation for the facilities left behind. The
paragraph provides for a right to remove before relinquishment of the
base on which the structures are situated or before expiration of the
Agreement. 162 After expiration, the United States loses its removal right
unless the Philippines permits a reasonable time in which to implement
this provision.16 Paragraph (2) further provides that the Philippines
need not pay compensation for improvements, buildings or structures left
behind. 164 These shall become Philippine property at the termination of
the Agreement, unless a new treaty is drafted to provide otherwise.
B. The Context of the 1947,Agreement
While a reading of the removal provisions alone provides the United
States with a broad removal right, any interpretation should also take
into account the context of the 1947 Agreement. The context comprises
the text of the Agreement, including its preamble and annexes, and any
related or subsequent agreements. 65 The United States' exercise of the
removal provisions for termination purposes, in order to remove all facil-
ities and structures just before the Agreement expires, may actually con-
flict with the context of the Agreement.
The text of the 1947 Agreement evinces an operation rather than
termination purpose for the removal provisions. The preamble states
that the Agreement's purpose is to promote the mutual security of the
United States and the Philippines, and to maintain peace in the Pa-
cific.166  Thus the two governments agreed to the Agreement's terms
for the "delimitation, establishment, maintenance and operation" of the
military bases.1 67 Article III provides the United States with wide opera-
162. 1947 Agreement, supra note 4, art. XVII, para. 2.
163. Within the context of military bases, a "reasonable time" in which to exercise the
removal right may take a number of years, especially if the United States decides to wait for
the installation of replacement facilities before the forces surrender possession of the Philippine
bases. See Pacific Pit Stop, supra note 115, at 1, col. 1 (time required for replacement facilities
elsewhere may take eight years).
164. 1947 Agreement, supra note 4, art. XVII, para. 2.
165. Vienna Convention, supra note 12, art. 31(2)-(3).
166. 1947 Agreement, supra note 4, preamble.
167. Id.
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tional and use rights within the bases.168 Further, the United States
agreed not to use these rights "unreasonably.'
1 69
The need for operational flexibility properly requires the availability
of a broad removal right. Under the removal provisions, the United
States can improve deteriorating facilities and structures on the bases.
Consequently, the removal right is corollary to maintaining the bases for
mutual security purposes. Conversely, the removal of all facilities and
structures just before the Agreement expires would not further mutual
security purposes. With the bases left intact, the Philippine Armed
Forces could assume operational and security functions in the Pacific re-
gion, filling in any gap the United States would leave behind.
Subsequent amendments to the 1947 Agreement establish that the
United States has accorded the Philippines an increasing role in the oper-
ation of the bases and removal of any facilities or structures. The United
States affimed Philippine sovereignty over the bases in the 1979 Amend-
ments. 7 ° In addition, the 1983 Memorandum provides the Military Ba-
ses Agreement Joint Committee, a consultation body which facilitates
continuing implementation of the Agreement, with the authority to re-
view base areas that may be returned to the Philippines. 171 This commit-
tee not only provides each country with a voice in negotiations, but also
serves as a check on any unilateral action concerning the bases. Other
amendments suggest that the United States practice has been to leave
"buildings and structures" intact, by providing for the relinquishment of
lands included in the original annexes of the 1947 Agreement. 72 Evi-
dence of this practice suggests that the removal right, though broad, will
probably not be exercised at all.
The 1947 Agreement should also be viewed in light of related agree-
ments such as the Military Assistance Agreement and the Mutual De-
fense Treaty. 173 As mentioned before, the Philippines accepted the 1947
Agreement as one of a package of treaties upon independence. By these
treaties, the United States forged a security alliance in the Pacific region.
Full exercise of the removal provisions just prior to the Agreement's ex-
168. Id. art. III, paras. 1-2.
169. Id. para. 3.
170. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
171. 1983 Memorandum, supra note 65, Joint Statement.
172. See, eg., Agreements Implementing the Agreement, July 1 & Sept. 12, 1947, United
States-Philippines, 3 U.S.T. 457, T.I.A.S. No. 2406 (providing for transfer of Leyte-Samar to
concurrent use by the forces); Transfer of Certain Military Reservations, May 14 & 16, 1949,
United States-Philippines, 63 Stat. 2660, T.I.A.S. No. 1963 (amending annex I of the 1947
Agreement); 1979 Amendments, supra note 61, annexes I & II (reducing areas available to
United States use).
173. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
January 1987] MILITARY BASE REMOVAL PROVISIONS 451
piration would contradict the spirit of the Mutual Defense Treaty. Leav-
ing the buildings and structures as resources for the Philippine Armed
Forces would better serve the interest of "strengthen[ing] . .. present
efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security...
in the Pacific Area."' 74 This would especially be true if the Mutual De-
fense Treaty continues despite the Agreement's termination. 75  The
many security ties between the United States and the Philippines suggest
that all facilities and structures will be left behind if expiration occurs on
friendly terms. These structures will help the Philippines maintain secur-
ity in the Pacific region and remain a close ally of the United States.
C. Supplementary Means of Interpretation
Should interpretation of the removal provisions under Article 31
lead to manifestly absurd or unreasonable results, Article 32 of the Vi-
enna Convention provides recourse to preparatory work on the 1947
Agreement and the circumstances of its conclusion. 176  If the United
States chooses to fully exercise its broad removal right, such action ar-
guably leads to an unreasonable result-total destruction of the bases.
The interpretation should then take into consideration the colonial rela-
tionship of the two countries at the inception of the Agreement. The
terms in the removal provisions would be construed against the party
that drafted the provisions, in this case, the United States.
Moreover, exercise of the removal provisions should not lead to to-
tal destruction of the structures and facilities because it is evident that
the drafters of the 1947 Agreement did not intend such a result. In a
1945 letter to President Truman, Secretary of War Stimson said that "a
constant screening of United States base sites should release to the Filipi-
nos sites as they become surplus to the United States needs. As they gain
174. Mutual Defense Treaty, supra note 32, preamble.
175. Regarding the Mutual Defense Treaty, consensus is that its retention is not incompati-
ble with terminating the 1947 Agreement. In a 1979 letter, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance
wrote that:
The Mutual Defense Treaty has force and effect independent of the Military Bases
Agreement. In fact, the Mutual Defense Treaty... states in its preamble that "...
nothing in this present instrument shall be considered or interpreted as in any way or
sense altering or diminishing any existing Agreements ... between [both countries]."
The [two agreements] have their own separate provisions for termination.
M. NASH, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1730 (1979). Ar-
ticle VIII of the Mutual Defense Treaty provides that the Treaty remains in force indefinitely,
however, "[e]ither party may terminate it one year after notice has been given to the other
Party." Mutual Defense Treaty, supra note 32, art. 8. Norway and Denmark are examples of
countries that have signed a defense treaty (NATO) but do not house foreign military bases on
their territories.
176. Vienna Convention, supra note 12, art. 32.
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in effectiveness, the Filipino forces should be accorded increasing partici-
pation in the use of certain United States bases."1 77 The foregoing quote
establishes Stimson's intent that the structures and facilities would be
returned to the Filipinos in the form of military bases, not destroyed
realty.
In summary, do grounds exist for limiting the exercise of Article
XVII? Either the invalidity of the whole Agreement or the Agreement's
potential interpretation suggest an affirmative answer. The Philippines
may argue that Article XVII is invalid since the whole 1947 Agreement
is invalid as an "unequal treaty." This argument may be considered
should the international legal community assent to use of the unequal
treaty argument. Assuming the Agreement is not invalidated as an "une-
qual treaty," the removal provisions should not be interpreted to allow
total destruction of the bases. As mentioned before, the use of compre-
hensive terms like "structures" without qualifying words can provide a
very broad right of removal. Although a fair reading of Article XVII
may not warrant total destruction of the bases, the provisions as they
presently exist leave this choice open. Such a broad removal right in an
international treaty is not warranted even by the private law of leases. It
is highly unlikely that the removal of "buildings and structures" (includ-
ing roads and water ports) can be achieved without doing substantial
harm to the underlying realty.
Finally, it is submitted that the removal provisions only entitle the
United States to tear down buildings and structures for the purpose of
maximizing use of the property while American forces remain there, not
to destroy the bases just before the right of access terminates. The pri-
mary interest of the United States in inserting these provisions at the
Agreement's inception was the effective operation of the bases. Reading
the provisions to give the United States the flexibility to improve deterio-
rating structures or facilities would be in consonance with maintenance
of the bases for the mutual security of both countries.
V. CONCLUSION
As the removal provisions currently stand, the parameters of the
United States' removal right leave room for misinterpretation. The pro-
visions' operational purpose, allowing removal for the improvement of
177. FOREIGN RELATIONS 1945, supra note 34, at 1206 (emphasis added). This intention
has been objectively manifested in amendments to the Agreement over the years, which have
either provided for the total relinquishment of lands or have allowed for concurrent use of base
areas by both American and Filipino forces. See supra note 172.
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facilities and structures, should be more clearly defined in any subse-
quently drafted treaty.
It should be noted that factors which favored the United States in
1947 are not dissimilar from those which give it an advantage at the ne-
gotiation table today.178 However, world public opinion and anti-Ameri-
can sentiment over the bases 179 may compel efforts to avoid any
semblance of inequality in the two countries' bargaining positions like
that which may have tainted the 1947 Agreement.
Perhaps the United States does have a responsibility to protect vital
shipping lanes and maintain a balance of security in the Western Pacific
region. A majority of Filipinos do not object to the presence of the bases
so much as to the reason for their presence. They are the reminder of a
colonial past that continues to rear its head in the form of economic de-
pendence. Although this Comment dealt only with removal provisions,
any treaty negotiated in the future should provide for more reciprocal
rights and obligations between the contracting nations.18 The Filipino
people's public expression of free consent will provide the final and essen-
tial element of future commitments to the bases.
Maria Teresa M. Lim*
178. The Philippines is currently struggling through what is probably its worst economic
crisis since the postwar era. See Tifft, supra note 8, at 25, col. 1.
179. Various leftist groups formed the Anti-Bases Coalition in February 1979. This group
seeks the immediate abrogation of the Agreement. F. BUNGE, supra note 3, at 221. In the
Declaration of Principles signed January 6, 1983, the Anti-Bases Coalition charged that the
bases impair national sovereignty and violate article 16 of the Charter of Economic Rights and
Duties of States adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1974. 1983 Hearings,
supra note 1, at 89 app. 4; Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, supra note 113,
art. 16.
180. This Comment focused on the Agreement's removal provisions. However, the author
suggests that a new treaty be drafted in which just compensation for use of the bases would be
part of the same instrument as the bases agreement. As such, the treaty would more closely
resemble a private law contract with reciprocal rights and obligations.
"Praise be to the name of God ....
He changes times and seasons;
He sets up kings and deposes them."
Daniel 2:20-21
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